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Abstract 
 
 
Substantial research attention has been devoted to the pension accumulation process, whereby 
employees and those advising them work to accumulate funds for retirement.  Until recently, less 
analysis has been devoted to the pension decumulation process – the process by which retirees 
finance their consumption during retirement.  This gap has recently begun to be filled by an 
active group of researchers examining key aspects of the pension payout market. One of the 
areas of most interesting investigation has been in the area of annuities, which are financial 
products intended to cover the risk of retirees outliving their assets.  This paper reviews and 
extends recent research examining the role of annuities in helping finance retirement 
consumption. We also examine key market and regulatory factors. 
  
 Annuities for an Ageing World 
 
 
  The recent passing of the British Queen Mother at age 101 has brought home to many 
observers the very real possibility that living to be quite old is a risk to which many of us are 
increasingly exposed.  Longevity patterns throughout the developed world indicate that many 
more of us will live beyond what was once considered the "normal" retirement age, surviving to 
celebrate our 100
th birthdays and beyond.  One long-term consequence of g lobal demographic 
aging is that it will become increasingly challenging to maintain a decent standard of living 
during such a long retirement period.  Planning ahead for retirement requires confronting and 
managing a host of risks that threaten to undermine our prospect of retirement wellbeing. 
  Over the next half-century, global aging trends will imply that more of the world’s 
population will attain the age of 60 and over than ever before, amounting to a higher fraction 
than children under 15.   By 2050, there will be several million centenarians alive on earth, more 
than at any prior time in human civilization (Desai, 2002).  This dramatic global aging process 
represents an historical “first” by world standards, and it prompts a fundamental question for 
retirement systems experts: namely, how can societies finance longevity risk, in the light of ever-
longer-lived populations?   
  In this light, the appeal of life annuities is that they offer retirees an opportunity to protect 
against the risk of outliving their assets, by exchanging these assets for a lifelong stream of 
guaranteed income (BMPW, 2001).  That is, life annuities are financial products, which, in 
exchange for an initial premium, pay beneficiaries a periodic benefit as long as the annuitant 
lives. Contracts protecting people from outliving their life expectancies have been around since 
at least the 1300s (Jennings and Trout, 1982).  Recently, however, insurance companies have 
taken on the task of pooling annuity purchasers with similar life expectancies but different 
longevity realizations, to help protect them against longevity risk.  In many countries, however, 
life annuity products have tended to be sold as retirement accumulation vehicles, rather than as 
decumulation products. 
 This may explain why annuity markets in the OECD countries have 
been relatively underdeveloped to date.
1   
                                                 
1 See for instance BMPW (2001); Doyle, Mitchell and Piggott (2001); Finkelstein and Poterba (2000); Murthi et al.,  
(1999); Sheshinki (2002); and Tonks (1999).     2
  Nevertheless, global interest in annuity markets is beginning to grow. In Latin America, 
for instance, more than a dozen countries have recently converted their unfunded national 
defined benefit (DB) pension plans into funded defined contribution (DC) pensions.
2 With the 
new models well in place, these nations have now begun to consider how the payout phase of 
these benefit programs will be handled. Many European countries have also begun moving 
toward funded pension systems and these reforms are focusing attention on European annuity 
markets.
3  This paper identifies factors shaping annuity markets in the past, with a primary focus 
on longevity protection in developed  nations.  We then identify developments that promise 
potential growth for annuity markets, over the near term as the baby boom generation retires.  
 
 
I.  Is Longevity Insurance a Good Deal?
4 
In a world with no uncertainty, it would be straightforward for a retiree to allocate his 
wealth at retirement by spreading payments over his remaining life years. If no formal retirement 
system were in place, the life-cycle model predicts that rational decisionmakers would save 
optimally; at retirement, they would merely divide their assets over years remaining, so as to 
ensure optimal retirement consumption (and cover bequest motives, if any).
5   
In reality, of course, many sorts of uncertainty make it far more difficult to decide how 
much to consume in old age. One risk is that associated with unknown longevity: retirees could 
outlive their expected lifespans, and run the risk of exhausting assets before passing away.  
Retirees can reduce this risk by consuming less per year, but such a tactic then boosts the chance 
that they might die with too much wealth left unconsumed.  In other words, dying with too little 
wealth is undesirable, but having too much wealth is also undesirable since it represents forgone 
consumption opportunities.   
  Retirement security can potentially be enhanced with the purchase of a life annuity which 
provides a steady income stream until the insured party’s death.  The annuity thus involves a 
                                                 
2 See Mitchell and Barretto (1997) and Palacios and Rofman (2001) for a discussion of the Latin reforms. 
3 See Cardinale (2002 and Cardinale et al. (2002); Blake (1999); Disney (2000); Disney and Johnson (2000); 
European Commission (1997), and Maurer and Schlag (2002) among others, for discussions of the European 
reforms. 
4 This discussion draws on BMPW (2001).   
5 The classic references are Ando and Modigliani (1963), and Modigliani (1986).   3
premium paid to an insurer, who then pools retirees with similar ex ante longevity expectations 
but different ex post survival outcomes (MPWB, 1999; Warshawsky 1998a).   
  To illustrate these issues, data from 2000 indicate that 65-year old US males could have 
anticipated a life expectancy of age 81, but some 18% would anticipate living to age 90 or older. 
Analogously a 65-year old female expected 19.6 more years of life, but she had a 31% chance of 
living to age 90 or older (Table 1).  The high probability of living to very old age underscores the 
important degree of uncertainty facing people as they allocate their retirement assets. An 
alternative approach is depicted in Figure 1, where we illustrate alternative consumption profiles 
generated by alternative wealth drawdown rules. The profile labeled “1/LE” assumes that the 
retiree draws down his retirement wealth completely by the time he has reached his life 
expectancy at age 65.  The individual consumes a level amount each year, which takes into 
account any investment earnings on his retirement wealth (here assumed to earn 4% p.a. fixed). 
Clearly this strategy h as the retiree running out of money if he outlives his life expectancy 
(probability = 43%). A smoother but declining consumption path is represented by the profile 
labeled “1/Rem LE,” which assumes that each year the retiree recomputes the level fraction of 
retirement wealth he can consume based on his updated life expectancy.  For comparison, the 
profile labeled “Life Ann” assumes the retiree’s entire wealth is used to purchase an actuarially 
fair life annuity which smoothes consumption from 65.  
Table 1 here 
Figure 1 here 
 
Alternative Payout Profiles  
      Recent research has sought to explore the pros and cons of alternative wealth drawdown 
patterns in retirement, to determine whether higher returns on non-annuitized investments might 
offset the value of the longevity insurance (which also must take into account insurance loads 
and fees).   
  Some might think that an older person might do better by holding onto his assets and 
investing them directly early in retirement, and waiting to buy an annuity later. This perception 
arises because annuity payouts are higher for those who purchase them later in life, reflecting 
higher expected mortality of older purchasers. But as Figure 2 shows, this is not necessarily a 
good strategy. Buying an annuity implies that survivors share the assets of those who died   4
prematurely  – essentially pooling the mortality risk of longer and shorter-lived people.   As 
individuals age, mortality increases, implying that this effect becomes relatively more important.  
Consequently, the rate of return that a surviving retiree who had not annuitized his wealth would 
have to “beat” in order to be at least as well off as if he had annuitized his wealth rises with age.  
In other words, older people’s money must work harder “if they are not to lose by delaying 
buying an annuity” (Inland Revenue, 2002:15).  
Figure 2 here 
      As an alternative approach, Albrecht and Maurer (2002) using German data demonstrate 
that the probability of exhausting one’s assets prior to death without an annuity can be quite 
substantial, though how likely this is will depend on the asset allocation of the retiree’s non-
annuity wealth.  Not only does the volatility of the self-insurer’s investment portfolio matter, but 
also so does the interest rate assumed on the annuity asset. In this case an actuarially fair annuity 
is used as a benchmark (see Figure 3).  In the German case, holding some equities provides 
higher expected returns as compared to annuities, depending on the assumed interest rate (AIR) 
used in pricing the annuity product.  
Figure 3 here    
 
Assessing Payoffs from Life Annuities 
      One way to assess the value of longevity protection is to measure the “money’s worth” 
(MW) of life income products.  This is facilitated by computing the expected present discounted 
value (EPDV) of the lifelong benefit stream paid out to the annuitant, and comparing this 
discounted cashflow to the annuity premium.  In the economics literature, the MW is most easily 
understood in the instance of an immediate single-life annuity which pays out $A per period for 
life, in exchange for an initial purchase price (e.g. $100,000).   
  For a nominal annuity, MPWB (1999) specifies that  qa,t is the probability that an a-
month-old individual alive at the beginning of month t will die during that month. P j is the 
probability that a 65-year old retiree survives for at least j months after he purchases a lifelong 
annuity: 
6 
(1)  ). q (1 * ... * ) q (1 * ) q (1    =    P j j1, + 780 781,2 780,1 j - - -  
                                                 
6 To compute the EPDV of an annuity purchased by a 65-year-old, one must forecast future mortality probabilities, 
discussed below. Computations also assume that no one lives beyond age 115 years; our calculations are insensitive 
to this upper limit on lifespan.   5
In this context, the EPDV of a life annuity with monthly payout A purchased by an individual of 
age b is Vb(A), which can depend on a term structure of interest rates, ik, expressing the nominal 
short rate k periods into the future:  
(2) 
) i + (1
P * A
     =    A V
k
j
1 = k
j 600
1 = j b
P
￿ ) (  
In much annuity research, the term structure of yields on Treasury bonds is used to estimate the 
time series of expected future nominal short-term interest rates.
7   For inflation indexed, or real 
annuities, equation (2) incorporates the fact that payout is fixed in real terms (but varies in 
nominal terms).  As BMP (2002) illustrate, this is easily expressed by letting Ar represent the real 
annual payment (and nominal interest rates in the denominator of equation (2) are replaced with 
real interest rates rk).  Then the EPDV of the real annuity becomes:  
(3)   
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  Irrespective of the payout format, an annuity product’s “money’s worth” is then defined 
as the ratio of the EPDV of the annuity’s payout stream to its purchase price.  For instance, a 
nominal annuity selling for $100,000 has a money’s worth defined as V b(An)/100,000.  Such a 
money’s worth ratio represents a currency-independent metric for comparing annuities across 
different groups, over time, and across countries. 
  
Annuity Prices and Benefit Flows  
In practice, constructing MW measures requires that the analyst obtain data on several 
key parameters, some of which are difficult to obtain and complicated to understand.  Most 
importantly, data are needed regarding the payout stream and the premium charged by the 
annuity issuer.  These are not always simple to model, since many products are on the market 
taking many different payout forms and structured with a wide range of premium payment paths. 
For example, a buyer may pay for the annuity with one lump sum or in many payments over a 
long period of time. Further, the benefit payments may be fixed in nominal terms for the life of 
the annuity contract, or they may rise at a predetermined rate over time. In yet other cases a 
                                                 
7 In addition we evaluate the responsiveness of conclusions to taxes; in the US, federal tax treatment of annuities is 
quite complex (BMWP, 1999). A useful comparison of tax treatment for annuities across Europe is provided in 
Wadsworth et al. (2001).    6
retiree may receive dividends that vary with the value of the underlying assets in which the 
premium is invested, and/or an annuity policy may include a feature guaranteeing a death benefit 
to one’s heirs.   
The complexity of the annuity product market and the fact that products are not widely 
advertised makes it relatively difficult to compare them around the world.  In some countries, 
such as the US and Singapore, prices and structures of annuity products are available on the 
internet; in other countries, however, it is more difficult to compare annuity benefit and cost 
structures. The simplest product is a single premium immediate annuity, for which data appear in 
Table 2 for men and women at alternative ages in the US. Several sensible conclusions emerge 
from a scan of these data. First, monthly payouts are higher for older people, given the same 
immediate premium, due to the higher expected mortality of the older buyers. Second, men 
receive higher payouts than women, due to their higher anticipated mortality. Third, the 
dispersion across insurance companies indicates that it would pay to shop around, and fourth, 
payout levels are not closely correlated with the strength of the insurer. 
Table 2 here   
 
Mortality Tables 
To convert annuity payout data of this sort into money’s worth measures, it is critical to 
obtain high-quality information on mortality tables depicting a particular group’s distribution of 
expected remaining lifetime.  Many developed nations have their own mortality tables,
 8 having 
invested in the substantial effort and cost of collecting data on the incidence of deaths by age and 
sex.  Then experts convert these raw data into projection tables by estimating the probability that 
a group member aged x will die in the next year of life by fitting hazard models to observed 
distributions of deaths, or by applying a smoothing algorithm to the raw maximum likelihood 
estimates (McCarthy and Mitchell, 2002).  Of course mortality rates tend to be low except at the 
oldest ages, so obtaining reliable estimates of small probabilities depends on observing a large 
number of lives.  It is also important to recognize that these tables are not fixed, but rather 
change due to improvements in life expectancies. Particularly among older people, mortality 
                                                 
8  The Society of Actuaries maintains an excellent database of international mortality tables on its website  
www.soa.org.  Recent European population, insured lives, and annuitant mortality tables may be obtained from 
MacDonald (1997).  The Berkeley Mortality Database (http://demog.berkeley.edu/wilmoth/mortality) is an 
invaluable resource for those investigating population mortality in developed countries.   7
experiences have declined rapidly in developed countries, and this trend is expected to carry over 
to the future (Executive Committee, 1999).
   Consequently, those seeking to value future annuity 
payouts must take this into account by developing forward-looking  cohort  mortality tables, 
generally based on past trends.   
Not only do mortality patterns change over time; there are  important cross-country 
differences as well.
9 Inasmuch as US and UK data collection efforts are relatively consistent, 
these tables have been adopted by numerous other developed and developing countries: we have 
observed that US mortality tables tend to be used in the Western hemisphere, while UK tables 
are often adopted in former British colonies or where British influence was strong.  Frequently 
local actuarial adjustments are applied to the tables so as to make them more reflective of local 
conditions, though without good mortality data it is probably impossible to know whether the 
adjustments are adequate.  Unfortunately uncertainty regarding mortality tables can also cause 
insurance companies to raise prices, with adverse consequences for annuity markets in general. 
Conversely, countries seeking to develop annuity markets may find there is a strong public good 
aspect to the development and dissemination of mortality data. 
There is no single metric to assess such mortality differences,  the A/E (“A over E”) 
method expresses the number of deaths anticipated in a given group with a specified age 
structure using one mortality table, and compares these to the expected number of deaths in a 
population of the same size using a second mortality table.  This is equivalent to a ratio of the 
weighted average probabilities of death for the two mortality tables, using a specific population 
structure for the weights (McCarthy and Mitchell, forthcoming): 
(4)    A/E =  100
*
·
￿
￿
x
x x
x
x x
q w
q w
  
where 
*
x q is the probability that an individual of age x dies according to the table in question, and 
x q is the probability that an individual of age x dies according to the base table.  The weights, 
x w , are set so that 65 w  = 100,000, and  ) 1 ( 1 1 - - - = x x x q w w .   
Two examples of A/E measures are provided in Figures 4 and 5.  Figure 4 represents 
mortality trends for US men age 65+ over time, using the 1991 male population table as the 
                                                 
9 This discussion draws on McCarthy and Mitchell (forthcoming).   8
benchmark. The trend shows clearly that men’s mortality has fallen by just under one-third since 
1965, a rather remarkable achievement; results are similar for women.  A/E population metrics 
that can be computed across the OECD appear in Figure 5. All statistics assume a benchmark of 
US age 65+ male population tables using the US 1991 tables as a benchmark.  These data show 
that Canada and Australia have very similar mortality patterns as the US, whereas Japan has 
much lower male population mortality rates. Results for Italy as well as Germany indicate 
substantially higher mortality patterns (among others).   
Figures 4 and 5 here 
An additional, and key aspect, of cross-national mortality table comparisons for annuity 
purposes pertains to the role of adverse selection. This arises in the present context if buyers of 
annuities prove to be longer lived than average, prompting actuaries to devise separate mortality 
tables for annuitants versus the general population.  Whether adverse selection is quantitatively 
important may depend on whether annuitization is optional or mandatory:  for example, in the 
US, purchase of annuities has become increasingly a matter personal choice, since defined 
benefit pension plans are in decline (Brown and Warshawsky, 2000).  As a result there are 
substantial differences in the US, as well as many countries, between population and annuitant 
mortality tables as illustrated in Figure 6.   
Figure 6 here 
Measuring the extent of adverse selection among annuity purchasers as compared to the 
population is critical for proper annuity pricing, but some countries lack the data necessary to do 
this with care. Table 3 present A/E results for men and women age 65 in the US, UK, and Japan, 
for voluntary as well as compulsorily purchased annuities (where available). In the UK, for 
example, a portion of retirement benefits is often subject to mandatory annuitization, with other 
benefits voluntarily annuitized. As a result, the insurers have generated separate UK mortality 
tables for both voluntary and compulsory-purchase annuitants, each of which differs from that of 
the general population (Finkelstein and Poterba, 1999; Murthi et al, 1999).   In this case, the 
reference or “base” table is the population table for that country.  Patterns for men, in the top 
panel, as well as women in the bottom panel, indicate that voluntary annuitants experience much 
lower mortality than do compulsory annuitants.
 Results for Japan are markedly different, with 
male insurance purchasers having apparently heavier mortality than voluntary annuitant holders, 
but rates equalizing for women.      9
Table 3 here 
Next we use available population and annuitant mortality data from a range of developed 
countries, to measure the empirical degree of adverse selection in annuitant mortality tables 
internationally.
10  The derived average measure of adverse selection then becomes a benchmark 
that can be held up against results for specific countries, to evaluate whether and how far a 
particular country may deviate from the standard.
11 The dependent variable in this analysis is the 
A/E value for each table relative to the US Male Population period table (=100).  The model 
relates this to the degree of selection associated with annuitants, controlling on regressors 
including country-specific indicators (the US is the omitted category), indicators of whether the 
table was for male or female (male is the omitted category), for period or cohort (period is the 
omitted category), and whether the table was a population or compulsory or voluntary annuitant 
table (population is the omitted group).  Other cross-country effects are assumed to be 
uncorrelated and captured in a disturbance term in the following regression model:  
 
(5)    ijkl l k ijkl G T G S T dG Y e l q z a + + + + + + + = ) * ( ) * ( j i S ?' C ß'  
 
where  ijkl Y  refers to the A/E metric for the mortality table in question; Ci is a vector of indicator 
variables representing country; Sj is a vector representing the degree of selection;  Gk is a scalar 
representing gender; and Tl is a scalar representing table type (cohort or period).  Remaining 
noise is summarized in the error  term  ijkl e , modeled as independent, identically distributed 
random variables.
12  If mortality tables display no additional statistically significant adverse 
selection, after controlling on the country-specific effects as well as table and  gender 
                                                 
10 This section draws on Mitchell and McCarthy (2002). 
11 Our work acknowledges that the distinctions between population versus compulsory and voluntary annuitant 
tables may not be precisely identical across countries. Selection is defined here as ‘compulsory’ if the mortality table 
relates to annuitants of pension plans, and ‘voluntary’ if it refers to voluntary individual annuitants.  Countries may 
have different voluntary or compulsory selection effects, even within these categories, due to different labor force 
demographics (including participation rates), compensation packages, tax codes, and legislation.   
12 Our earlier work also explored results in which “table type” was treated as a random effect with non-zero mean 
and variance 
2
T s , to allow for the possibility that cohort mortality tables may be based on period mortality tables. 
We reject the null hypothesis that  0
2 = T s  using a likelihood ratio test and coefficient estimates are virtually 
unchanged.  We also estimated standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and found these to be lower than OLS 
standard errors; here we report the more conservative OLS results.   10
differentials, g will equal 0. Our alternative hypothesis is that 0 ? „ ; the coefficient magnitude is 
then an indication of the extent of predictable adverse selection in annuitant mortality tables.    
  Regression results appear in Table 4, based on data on over 60 population and annuitant 
mortality tables for ten countries including Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Germany, Israel, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, and the US, representing more over half a billion lives.
13  Estimated 
results show the model fits very well overall with an adjusted R-squared of 98.8%. Turning to 
specific coefficients, we find that the “female effect” turns out to be negative and statistically 
significant for the A/E measure, and implies that mortality rates for women are 35 percent lower 
than the benchmark US male population rates. This is comparable to the 33 percent and 26 
percent lower relatively mortality experienced for voluntary and compulsory annuitants, versus 
the population.  Only one of the interaction terms is statistically significant, indicating that 
selection between female voluntary annuitants and the population is one-third lower than among 
men.  
Table 4 here 
  The results also show no significant difference between estimated coefficients for the 
voluntary versus compulsory selection variables.  This implies that the extent of compulsory and 
voluntary selection overlaps in different countries to some extent.  The data series are consistent 
with an average degree of adverse selection for annuitants versus the general population, of at 
least 25 percent.   The cohort effect is much smaller, on the order of 12 percent relative lower 
mortality.  Another factor to emphasize is fact that many of the country-specific effects are 
statistically significant, with the exception of Italy, and Germany.  Some countries, such as 
Austria and Israel, have substantially higher (12-13%) mortality than the US benchmark, while  
Japan, Switzerland, and Canada have 10-14% lower mortality than the US.  
  Predicted male A/E cohort values derived from this regression analysis are provided for 
male population and annuitant mortality in Figure 7.  The results indicate that according to our 
model, Italy and Germany both have higher annuitant mortality than US tables, but Switzerland, 
Australia, Canada and Japan appear well below the US benchmark. 
Figure 7 here 
                                                 
13 For sources see McCarthy and Mitchell (2002 and forthcoming).   11
  While some countries have the necessary mortality data needed to produce annuitant 
tables for voluntary versus compulsory annuities, others do not.  For instance, Italy does not – 
the 1995 RG48 annuitant mortality table used in our analysis was constructed by applying an 
estimate of adverse selection obtained from UK annuitant tables.
14  Therefore in Figure 8 we use 
the results of the regression analysis to generate predicted values of the A/E metric, and also we 
represent male and female voluntary annuitant tables for Germany and Italy, as well as Japanese 
compulsory and voluntary annuitant tables.  The vertical axis represents the A/E measure, while 
the vertical bars represent confidence intervals for predicted levels of the A/E metric. The points 
show where we calculated that these tables actually life.  Examination of the results indicates that 
predicted values for the German annuitant tables are well within estimated confidence intervals. 
However results for Italian male annuitants fall outside the confidence intervals, as do the results 
for Japanese male and female tables (circled in the Figure).  In other words, these findings 
indicate excess mortality as compared to what international norms would suggest for tables of 
this type. 
Figure 8 here  
The fact that annuitant tables differ so much in Japan and Italy from the international 
norms could indicate either that these countries have annuity markets that are unusual in an 
international context, or that there is some problem with the way the annuitant mortality tables 
are computed.   In fact, in both cases, these mortality tables are derived without reference to the 
mortality of actual annuitants, suggesting a possible reason why they fall outside our predicted 
confidence intervals.  Of course, these results need not imply that annuity prices or liability 
estimates are incorrect for the annuity business in those countries, because actuaries use many 
different assumptions to value annuities, and it is not uncommon to alter one or more other 
assumptions to compensate for a mortality assumption known to be inaccurate.  But there is a 
chance that using offsetting assumptions can lead to inaccurately estimated reserves, distort 
sensitivity estimates, and complicate analyses of insurer surplus/strain. In general, such practice 
is best avoided.  
 
Discount Rate Assumptions 
                                                 
14   In fact, when we performed this analysis we did not have the actual RG48 table.  We used life expectancies of 
individuals on the RG48 tables, obtained from MacDonald (1997) and the fact that life expectancy is very closely 
related to the A/E measure to derive confidence intervals for the actual A/E metric for the RG48 tables.   12
  As with all economic assumptions, there is no single and clear-cut rule about what 
discount rates to use when deriving annuity valuation formulas. One approach uses term 
structures for yields on government bonds, on the argument that the annuity payoff depends on 
an individual’s mortality, which is essentially uncorrelated with market risk.  Yields on 
government bonds are particularly appropriate when insurers are backed by government 
solvency funds, as is often the case. Another tactic uses riskier corporate bond yields to proxy for 
expected future interest rates, on the view that insurers often hold such instruments to back their 
annuity promises.  Others argue that discount rates for annuity computations should recognize 
that governments frequently regulate insurance company investment practices.  For instance, the 
fraction of annuity assets that insurers can hold in equities is capped at 30% in Peru and 40% in 
Chile; no real estate investment is permitted in Argentina (Palacios and Rofman, 2001).  In other 
countries there may be few or no long-term government bonds, and even when they exist, 
markets may be thin (James and Song, 2001).     
   
  In our research on US annuities, we use nominal yields on US Treasury bonds to estimate 
the term structure of expected short-term interest rates; the expected nominal short rate in each 
future period is computed as the nominal short rate that would satisfy the expectations theory of 
the term structure for the two adjacent long-term bonds (BMP, 2000 and 2002). We also explore 
the sensitivity of results to flat term structures, with the discount rate given variously by the ten-
year Treasury bond yield, the thirty-year Treasury bond yield, and the BAA corporate bond 
yield.   
 
Utility Value of Annuity Products 
      Before turning to the results, we note that risk-averse consumers would be expected to 
value annuities more highly than the simple financial money’s worth ratio, since the insurance 
component provides additional utility against the shortfall risk.  It is not surprising that the 
economics literature shows that annuities should appeal most to risk-averse consumers,
15 while 
less risk-averse retirees, and people seeking to provide their heirs with bequests, will be likely to 
want to self-insure with some portion of their assets.  
                                                 
15 See, for instance, Albrecht and Maurer (2002); Milevsky (1998, 1999); Blake and colleagues (1999, 2001, 2002); 
and Warshawsky (1998a and b).   13
      A commonly-used metric for the utility value of annuities is the  equivalent wealth 
measure.  Specifically, this concept identifies the additional wealth a consumer would require, if 
he did not have longevity protection, to achieve the same lifetime utility as with that annuity 
(MPWB, 1999) . This approach assumes that the consumer elects an optimal consumption path 
{Ct} from time 0 to time T (the maximum possible lifespan), given his rate of time preference r 
and a vector of cumulative survival probabilities {Pt} to maximize an expected utility function 
V:  
{ }
( )
￿
= +
T
t
t
t t
C
C U P
Max
t 0 ) 1 ( r
.  The consumer’s budget constraint depends on whether he has access to a 
fair annuity market.  If he does not, the present value of future consumption, discounted using 
the riskless interest rate r, must equal to his initial wealth, W 0: 
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 . If he can 
purchase actuarially fair annuities, the budget constraint then becomes: 
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.  The 
difference between the two budget constraints is due to survival probabilities.  That is, lacking 
access to annuity markets, a retiree’s future consumption cannot exceed his initial wealth; by 
contrast with an annuity, his expected future consumption cannot exceed his initial wealth.   In 
other words, access to annuity markets reduces the relative price of future consumption and 
lowers the amount of precautionary saving that he must undertake.  
To actually measure how much a consumer might value an annuity requires that the 
researcher specify the functional form for the utility function, along with the relevant risk-
aversion parameters. In much economic research, a one-period utility function, U(Ct), is assumed 
to exhibit constant relative risk aversion:  ( )
b
b
-
=
-
1
1
t
t
C
C U , where b is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient 
of relative risk aversion, and 1/b is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. 
The indirect utility function V(.) which corresponds to the budget constraint permits evaluation 
of the maximum utility that an individual might attain by following his optimal consumption 
path. Finally, it is possible to evaluate the utility gain in financial terms by computing how much 
additional wealth the retiree would require if he lacked access to annuities, if he were to be made   14
as well off as with annuities.  This computation requires solving for  a such that: 
( ) ( )
annuities annuities no W V W V 0 0 0 0 = a .  In this formulation, a is the “Annuity Equivalent Wealth .”
16 
 
Illustrative Money’s Worth and Annuity Equivalent Wealth Computations
17  
  Panel A of Table 5 presents money’s worth calculations for annuities offered across a 
range of developed countries, specifically, for the Australia, Canada, Switzerland, the UK, and 
the US.
18   These results were developed using both annuitant as well as population mortality 
tables, in order to indicate the extent to which adverse selection may play a role.  
Table 5 here 
  These estimates indicate that annuities computed in each of these countries using 
population tables prove to have very high money’s worth ratios. Estimates are at 0.90 or better in 
all countries but the US. This implies that a typical member of the population could anticipate 
receiving at least 90 percent of his premium from the single life annuity. The results also imply  
that adverse selection as well as loadings and administrative charges must be below ten percent 
of the purchase price.
19   
  Results are even more consumer-favorable using  the figures computed with annuitant 
mortality tables.  In the US, for instance, the MW ratio with annuitant survival rates stands at 
around 93% for both men and women, versus figures of 81-85% using population tables.  The 
difference between these numbers, 8-11%, is indicative of the extent of adverse selection. That 
is, the difference is a measure of how much longer annuity buyers live than people in the general 
population. The remaining load of 7% indicates relatively low charges and fees levied by US 
insurers; this number is half what it was in the previous decade (Brown et al. 2000).  Panel A 
also implies that annuity products are exceptionally good investments in a few countries  – 
perhaps too good to be believable.  In Canada, for instance, the estimated values using annuitant 
tables are above 1.0, meaning that an annuitant could anticipate receiving more than his money 
back on this financial asset.  This may be the result of using overly conservative discount rates to 
                                                 
16 The derivation requires dynamic programming algorithms described in MPWB (1999) for the case of a single 
individual; Brown and Poterba (1999) discuss the case of couples: and BMP (2002) discuss the case with uncertain 
returns and/or inflation. 
17 This discussion draws on Mitchell (2002). 
18 For other countries see Cardinale et al. (2002), Doyle et al. (2001), Finkelstein and Poterba (2001), James and 
Song (2001), James and Vittas (1999), and Murthi et al. (1999). 
19 The Swiss money’s worth figures may be overly high, the result of quite conservative discount rates; see James 
and Song (2001).   15
compute the expected present values.  In any event, a financial assessment of these life annuity 
products indicates that (a) adverse selection explains a substantial portion of the load perceived 
by potential purchasers in the general population, and (b) these products would be expected to be 
quite valuable to annuitant purchasers. 
  Panel B moves from a strict financial computation to the broader utility-based measure of 
annuity values. Specifically we report computations on annuity equivalent wealth for the US 
case, which it will be recalled represents the amount of wealth that a consumer would need if he 
did not have access to an annuity market, in order to achieve the same lifetime expected utility 
level that he could achieve by using that wealth to purchase a nominal annuity.
20  To illustrate the 
results we employ a logarithmic utility function to represent the consumer’s utility, and a 
relatively low level of risk aversion (CRRA = 1). For such a person, a real (inflation-protected) 
single annuity would be valued at 1.5, assuming the retiree had no other annuitized wealth.  This 
signifies that such a consumer lacking access to an annuity, would be willing to give up half of 
his investment to obtain a real lifetime annuity with the same investment.  At higher levels of 
risk aversion, the annuity equivalent wealth value rises to 2, meaning that access to a real annuity 
is worth double the wealth than the same value invested in a nominal annuity.  Evidently, an 
annuity would be valued much more highly in utility terms, than in money’s worth terms. 
Results in Panel B also show that an inflation protected annuity is more valuable to the 
risk-averse consumer than is a nominal annuity. The CRRA=1 consumer, for instance, finds the 
real annuity worth 5-8 cents more per dollar invested versus a nominal annuity, and the value 
rises with higher risk aversion (at CRRA=10, the gap is 40-60 cents).  Our results do show that 
the valuation depends on how inflation is expected to move, however, since a real annuity is 
valued at 1.451 with i.i.d. inflation and 1.424 in the case of persistent inflation.
21  It is also 
critical to take into account the fact that the AEW measure depends on whether a retiree has 
some portion of his wealth already annuitized. The leftmost subsection of  Panel A (labeled I) 
                                                 
20 This section draws on MPWB (1999) and Mitchell (2002). 
21 BMP (2001) note that risk aversion and annuity equivalent wealth are not linearly related for nominal annuities in 
the presence of uncertain inflation, because risk aversion works in opposing directions in the face of inflation 
uncertainty.  On the one hand, higher risk aversion makes the consumer value an annuitized payout more highly 
since he avoids the risk of outliving his resources, and this is all that matters in the case of the real annuity.  On the 
other hand, a risk-averse consumer dislikes the uncertainty introduced into the nominal annuity stream by stochastic 
inflation.  Increased variability in the real value of the nominal annuity payouts reduces utility, and this effect is 
larger for those with the highest degree of risk aversion.  At low levels of risk aversion, the first effect dominates, 
and the annuity equivalent wealth for a nominal annuity rises with risk aversion.   16
assumes no other annuities, while the rightmost (II) section assumes that half of retiree wealth is 
already annuitized, perhaps through Social Security or occupational pensions.
22 In this case, the 
AEW associated with annuities is still substantial, but its value is reduced. For instance, the half-
annuitized consumer with CRRA=1 would need only one-third more wealth to be made as well 
off as if he had a real annuity, compared to 50% in the case where he lacked an annuity 
altogether.  Clearly having a pre-existing real annuity provides retirees with insurance against 
very low consumption values, and it drives down the value of additional privately-purchased 
annuities.   
 
II. Future Determinants of Annuity Markets  
  The economic literature over the last decade underscores the conclusion that annuities 
deserve an important role in retiree portfolios of the future. Though annuity markets in the past 
might have been underdeveloped, there are several reasons for optimism about their future 
potential.
23  We discuss these next in terms of demand-side factors, pertaining to reasons that 
retirees might find them more attractive in the future, and supply-side factors, relevant to the 
enhanced role that providers might play. Our final section offers a discussion of public policy 
changes that may also play a prominent role. 
 
Demand-side Factors 
  Some have claimed that retirees have shied away from annuities in the past because they 
were perceived to be “too expensive.” But the evidence presented above indicates that this is not 
necessarily true currently, and other information implies that it is even less valid now than in the 
past (BMPW, 2001).  Our finding of relatively moderate adverse selection and relatively low 
administrative loadings suggests that such charges can be and are being moderated over time.  In 
addition, the research shows that retirees should reap substantial utility benefits from insurance 
protection against longevity risk.  Thus well-managed annuity markets with charges of the 
magnitudes seen should be appealing to purchasers. Of course, as insurers in Europe and Asia 
build the markets there, it will still be essential to understand that consumers will expect 
reasonable money’s worth from the products. 
                                                 
22 For instance, the median US older household holds about three-fifths of its retirement resources in the form of 
expected future Social Security and pensions benefits, payable only as life annuities (Moore and Mitchell 2000).   
23 For further discussion of these points see Mitchell (2002) and BMWP (2001)   17
  Retirees’ decisions are also driven by people’s perceptions about the appeal of alternative 
retirement investments. For instance, some financial planners have advised retirees to avoid 
annuitizing, on the grounds that they can manage their money better than institutional pension 
managers.  Others propose that annuitization decisions be delayed to older ages, on the grounds 
that young retirees can then benefit from the upside potential of investment portfolios (Milevsky, 
1999). Still others argue that retirees should invest in financial assets since these may keep up 
with inflation better than annuities. This is an area of substantial ongoing research, though the 
prediction has been inaccurate for the US at various times (BMP, 2000), but may be better 
supported in Europe (Albrecht and Maurer, 2002). 
  A different reason that older people might avoid buying annuities is than some might 
wish to remain somewhat financially liquid in old age, whereas the traditional immediate annuity 
does not provide this option. For instance, the risk of perhaps having to pay large medical bills or 
cover nursing home costs could induce many elderly to hold on to the assets they have, instead of 
annuitizing them.  This concern may be mitigated in the future for several reasons. One is that 
some insurers have brought to market  new financial products that merge life annuities with 
nursing home insurance (Warshawsky et al.,2002).  Related to this point is the finding that 
improved health among older people may actually reduce the need for nursing home care, as a 
consequence curtailing the demand for long-term care (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002). Yet 
another factor that can enhance the demand for annuities is that financial products are being 
devised to help meet liquidity requirements, affording older people the chance to consume the 
net equity in their homes (Caplin, 2002).   This of course may conflict with older peoples’ 
desires to leave bequests, but economic research has no clear answer regarding just how a 
bequest motive can best be incorporated into models of annuity demand (Gale and Slemrod, 
2001).  Brown (2001) argues that most specifications imply that full annuitization is no longer 
optimal, and Blake et al. (2000) explore a range of possible and interesting alternative 
formulations.   
  Yet a further concern regarding the future demand for annuities is the possibility that 
retirees might seriously underestimate their survival prospects, which, if true, would lead them to 
downvalue longevity insurance.  An interesting survey on this point finds, however, that older 
people in the US at least are in fact very well-informed about their survival probabilities. That is, 
their expected survival patterns track actuarial tables quite closely (Figure 9).  Whether this is   18
more of a problem in Europe would be worth investigating empirically.  It is our impression that 
recent discussion of plummeting fertility and population aging in Europe would likely imply that 
many older people are reasonably well-informed about future survival patterns. 
Figure 9 here 
    Looking ahead, there are a number of other reasons that one might anticipate growth in 
demand for annuities in the European market. One is that mortality patterns are continuing to 
decline, and in many countries, actual longevity may be even higher than reported in official 
government statistics (Schieber and Hewitt, 2000). This is tied up with major changes forecasted 
in the role and function of traditional old-age retirement systems in the European region.  
Paralleling a movement that began in the US two decades ago, many countries have recently 
witnessed a  trend toward company-sponsored defined benefit plan termination (Mitchell, 
forthcoming). Furthermore, in much of Europe, state-financed public pensions will be forced to 
moderate benefit promises going forward. Both these factors imply a drop in the fraction of 
retirees’ retirement wealth that is a mandatory annuity, and in turn they suggest that insurance-
based and privately purchased annuity products will be in increasing demand as substitutes. 
   
Supply-side Considerations: 
  In many ways, the successful development and growth of annuity markets must depend 
on supportive public policy.  
  Large government social security systems may have crowded out annuity demand in 
many European countries.  This may explain why there is a small market for private annuities in 
European countries with the largest social security systems.  Figure 11 and Table 6 report after-
tax replacement rates for selected OECD countries in 1995, divided by source of income.  
Germany, Sweden, and Italy have the highest proportion of retirement income coming from 
government transfers, over 55%, and it is probably no coincidence that in these countries, the 
private annuity market is fairly small.  Nevertheless, as these countries’ populations age, their 
PAYGO systems will have to be reformed. Consequently the proportion of retirement income 
coming from government transfers will likely decrease, implying potential for growth in 
annuities markets. 
Figure 11 here 
Table 6 here   19
 
The Need for Better Mortality Information and Clear Supervision 
    Regulatory policy regarding mortality tables can drive both the demand and supply of 
annuities.  Well-functioning annuities markets depend on accurate mortality data.  Insurance 
companies that do not have access to high quality data will tend to price annuities conservatively, 
exacerbating adverse selection problems and lowering access to annuities markets.  Not only the 
mortality of current annuitants is needed, but also good projections about how mortality is likely 
to change in the future.  In most countries, this data is simply not available.  Cardinale et al. 
(2002) hypothesize that mortality data may in fact be a public good whose production costs are 
outweighed by positive externalities.   
       Regulations regarding how mortality data are used are also key to shaping the annuity 
market. For example the UK requires that unisex mortality tables are used to compute pension 
payouts (for benefits offered under “protected rights” legislation). As a result, mortality 
differences between men and women cannot be used to price payouts, which generates cross-
subsidization between male and female retirees on average. The common mortality table 
combined with mandatory annuitization thereby restrict the potential for adverse selection that 
otherwise might occur in voluntary annuitizations.  By contrast, unisex tables are required for 
employer pension calculations in the US but are not imposed on individual purchases; moreover 
many workers are permitted to take lump-sum cashouts from their company pension. This 
structure implies that informed and rational workers anticipating shorter-than-average life 
expectancies have incentives to cash out rather than take life annuity streams.  The policy issue, 
then, is how to integrate pension and insurance regulations so as not to detract too strongly from 
the appeal of annuities (Mitchell, 2000b).  Prior to the introduction of the Third Life Directorate 
of the European Union in 1994, many European countries regulated the tariffs that insurance 
companies were able to charge, often specifying out-of-date mortality tables or unisex tables 
(Davis 2002).  MacDonald (1997) reports that since this time, many countries in Europe have 
started to collect and use annuitant mortality data in pricing, although this practice continues in 
countries such as Japan and Mexico. 
 
New Roles for Government Provision of Financial Products.    20
      One supply-side explanation for thin annuity markets in some countries may be that 
insurers lack assets with which to back the long-term promises represented by annuities.  
Standard theory suggest that, in order to immunize themselves from small changes in interest 
rates, insurance companies would do well to back their annuity portfolios with assets whose 
duration equals the duration of the annuity liabilities.  This is difficult to do in practice if long-
term bonds are not available in national markets. 
  Figure 12 shows the term of the financial instruments needed to back actuarially fair 
annuities priced using US male voluntary annuitant cohort mortality tables.  As is evident from 
the figure, the term varies with the bond interest rate. This is due to so-called “convexity risk”,  
which results from the fact that the incidence of payments on an annuity portfolio and that of a 
coupon-bearing bond portfolio are necessarily  different.
24  The figure indicates that in the US 
market, at least, insurers would require twelve-year par bonds to exactly immunize themselves 
from interest rate changes, at zero interest rates.  If the company wished to sell annuities to 
females, it would require 13-year bonds trading at par (results not shown).  Should interest rates 
rise, the implied bond terms required fall somewhat, but only slowly.   
Figure 12 here 
  While the US does have a relatively well-developed long-term bond market, many other 
countries lack long-term assets. This implies that annuity markets would likely benefit from the 
issuance of longer term government bonds than are currently available. In addition, if real 
annuities are to be provided, real long bonds will have to be provided as well.  At present, only a 
select handful of countries currently offers inflation-linked bonds, including the US, UK, Israel, 
and most recently France.  Down the road, European insurers may therefore benefit from the 
recent entry by France into the Euro-denominated inflation-protected bond market.   
  Insurers, and customers purchasing the insurance products, should also consider the 
quality of the assets concerned.  Recent events in Argentina and Russia have shown that it is 
possible for governments to default on their debt.  The risk increases with the term of the bond, 
implying that insurers in emerging economies may be unwilling to sell annuities even if assets of 
sufficient term are available.  It is worth noting in this context that the debt rating of the Japanese 
                                                 
24   Of course, an insurer could exactly match the outgo of an annuity portfolio and the income of a bond portfolio by 
investing in zero-coupon bonds of varying terms.  However, zero coupon bonds of the term and quality required 
(>35 years, AAA+) currently exist in no bond market.   21
government was recently cut by Moody’s to the same risk class as Cyprus, Greece, Latvia and 
South Africa, indicating that this problem may not be confined to emerging markets.
25 
  There also remains a very real concern over cohort mortality risk. This is due to the 
chance that entire cohorts live longer than anticipated, which is of grave concern to those selling 
the products since substantial changes in mortality patterns could seriously challenge their 
profitability. Some contend that governments will have to issue cohort “survivor bonds” (Blake, 
et al. 2002). On the other hand, this problem may be resolved in the private market, by annuity 
providers which hedge longevity risk with offsetting life insurance contracts. Initial research on 
this topic using international data suggests, however, that this may be difficult to do in practice 
(McCarthy and Mitchell, forthcoming), though more research is needed on this point.   
  A related argument was made by financial experts and economists seeking to encourage 
the US government to issue inflation-linked bonds (Brynjolfosson and Fabozzi, 1999).  Retiree 
demand for these products in the US has been modest, though inflation rates have been quite low 
of late. In other pension markets, including the UK and Israel, inflation-linked bonds have 
become a mandatory component of the retiree portfolio and demand for these assets has been 
more substantial.   
 
Regulatory Policy Toward Annuities  
  The long-term solvency of insurance companies should also be important factor to 
consider, for individuals purchasing annuities.  In an environment where the liquidity position of 
insurance companies is sometimes in question due to the lack of an effective regulatory 
environment – as is the case in many emerging and developed countries – individuals may be 
deterred from participating in the annuities market (Mitchell, 2000a). Of course, in some cases 
there are guarantees provided to individual policyholders in the event of insurance company 
insolvency. In turn, this highlights the importance of effective solvency regulation because it 
introduces the possibility of moral hazard on the part of the annuity seller.  In some cases, the 
regulation of reserves can be a barrier to sellers because it imposes a large or highly variable 
need for capital or onerous reporting or valuation requirements (Lemaire 1997).  
                                                 
25 Standard and Poor’s (2002) also warns that the sovereign credit ratings of the majority of highly rated European 
Union members (EU-15) could fall to non-investment grade unless governments bring debt and deficit burdens 
under control.   22
  A key policy level influencing the future shape and form of annuity offerings is how 
governments encourage or discourage the growth of annuity products via tax incentives.  Across 
Europe and around the world, the range of tax programs is so extensive and complex as to be 
bewildering, most likely the result of tax law accretion over many years, and often producing 
conflicts with sensible social policy.  In Italy and France, for example, tax policy discourages 
companies from building up collateral assets that back pension promises, and also it encourages 
workers to take lump-sum withdrawals of deferred earnings instead of periodic payments or 
annuities (Cardinale 2002; Wadsworth et al., 2001). In the US, tax policy favors funding and 
provision of employer-sponsored annuity promises (to a limit), but it also establishes a rather 
undesirable profile of taxation on private annuity payouts that taxes people more heavily after 
retirees attains one’s life expectancy (BMPW 1999).  In Australia, tax and transfer policy favors 
purchase of fixed nominal annuities, but inflation-linked payouts and variable annuity programs 
are not similarly tax-favored.   
  Other regulations also apply to annuity products, and it is fair to say that in general, these 
are often complex and differ widely across countries. Yermo’s (2001) review of annuity 
regulation across OECD countries illustrates for example that Italy requires mandatory 
annuitization of half workers’ accumulated pension balances while Portugal requires annuitizing 
two-thirds of the balance; and Spain offers free choice between lump sum, term and life 
annuities.  Germany’s new Reister-reform law permits workers to take 20% of their accumulated 
assets at retirement in a lump sum, another 20% as a graduated withdrawal payment, and the 
remainder can be paid out in periodic payments with the stipulation that at age 85, the retiree 
must annuitized his balance and the benefit cannot be less than the periodic payment received 
before that age (Maurer and Shlag, 2002). Similarly, retirees at age 75 in the UK are required to 
annuitize their pension assets.    
 
The Need for Consumer Education 
  Some countries have taken the perspective that it is the government’s responsibility to 
promote public education and understanding regarding annuity products.  Thus, for instance, the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom was recently charged with statutory 
responsibility for enhancing consumer understanding and protection regarding annuity products 
(Inland Revenue, 2002).  This is to take the form of internet and paper explanations of terms and   23
pricing, as well as annuity types. Not only will this agency help new purchasers, but it will also 
take on the task of helping people contemplating switching providers, with a focus on fees and 
switching costs. As a different approach, the Italian government requires that annuity payouts be 
explicitly described to purchasers using real returns of 1% and 3%, so that buyers can compare 
payouts across products (Cardinale, 2002). In Mexico and several other Latin American 
countries, annuity providers must submit competitive bids to workers as they draw near their 
retirement dates, so as to enhance comparability and competition across insurers.   
 
III. Conclusions  
  As the world ages, it will become increasingly critical to develop and offer new financial 
products that help protect economic security during the retirement period.  This paper 
demonstrates that several f actors will drive modernization of global annuity markets in the 
future, particularly in European nations which are among the most challenged by rapid 
population aging.   
  Our review suggests several conclusions. First, the demand for annuities is likely to rise 
in the future, even for risk averse elders who want to keep some portion of their assets liquid. 
This will be driven by increased longevity, diminished public and corporate pensions, and the 
availability of new annuity linked products. Second, the supply of annuities is likely to grow, but 
here thoughtful public policy can play a beneficial role. Specifically, there are important ways in 
which governments can play a potent role in strengthening annuity markets. These include 
developing and disseminating high-quality data on mortality tables, enhancing consumer 
education and awareness of longevity insurance and how to compare prices, and streamlining tax 
policy to make it more attractive to invest in sensible products.  It may also be useful for 
governments to mitigate the potential problems caused by adverse selection, including 
encouraging group annuities and possibly requiring some minimum level of annuity provision.  
Finally, there may be new a role for governments in the future, if annuity markets are to thrive. 
Specifically, they can serve as sponsors of new financial products that can help insurers provide 
annuities more efficiently. These could include longer term government bonds that can be used 
to match annuity liability patterns, inflation-indexed bonds, and possibly, survivor bonds.   
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Figure 1: Alternative Consumption Profiles as a Function of Age 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure assumes worker attains retirement age with assets normalized at 1.0, and he draws 
down fractional amounts of remaining assets over his remaining lifetime.  The “1/LE” profile 
assumes that the retiree consumes a level proportion of his retirement wealth each year, at a rate 
sufficient to completely draw down all his wealth (and investment earnings) by the time he 
reaches his life expectancy (as of age 65).   The “Life Ann” profile assumes that the retiree’s 
entire wealth is converted into an actuarially fair life annuity payable from 65.  The profile 
labeled “1/Rem LE” assumes that the retiree recomputes the level consumption that will draw 
down his wealth over his remaining life expectancy each year, based on annually updated life 
expectancy.  All profiles assume retirement at 65 and a real investment return of 4%.      
Source: Authors’ computations using US Male population cohort table from McCarthy and 
Mitchell (2002). 
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Figure 2. Return Benchmark On Residual Capital That Would Have to Be Earned to 
Compensate For “Mortality Drag” 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure shows the return required to be earned on privately invested capital to compensate 
for the risk pooling aspect of annuities (which increases with age).  Figure assumes a real annual 
interest rate underlying annuity prices and US Male population cohort mortality from McCarthy 
and Mitchell (2002). 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Figure 3:  Shortfall Risk From Self-Insuring  
  
 
 
 
Note: Probability of consumption shortfall in retirement for a male retiring at age 60 who does 
not annuitize, but instead invests his portfolio in the specified mix of German stocks and bonds. 
The shortfall is computed compared to consumption that could be purchased with an annuity 
priced using the specified Assumed Interest Rate (AIR). 
Source: Albrecht and Maurer (2002). 
 
 
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
1
0
0
4
5
,
5
7
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
4
5
5
0
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
C
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
 
S
h
o
r
t
f
a
l
l
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
(
%
)
 
A
I
R
(
%
)
   31
 Figure 4:  Time Series Decline in US Male Mortality: 1965-1995 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data represent Actual/Expected death rates for US males, standardized so the 1991 table is 
equal to 100. 
Source: Social Security Administration, Male Population Mortality, reported on Berkeley 
Mortality Database, http://demog.berkeley.edu/wilmoth/mortality. 
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Figure 5: A/E Metrics for Selected OECD Countries 
  
 
 
Notes: The following male mortality tables from ~1991 were used for these computations (in 
some cases these were extended to 111):  
Finland  Central Bureau of Statistics 1986-1990 
NetherlandsCentral Bureau of Statistics 1985-1990 
Germany  Federal Statistics Office 1990-1992 
Austria  Statistische Zentralamt 1990-1992 
Denmark  Danmarks Statistik, Statistical Yearbook 1990-1992 
UK  Government Actuaries Department 1999 
NZ  Statistics New Zealand, 1990-1992 
Norway  Statistics Norway, 1993 
Sweden  National Central Bureau of Statistics, 1993 
Australia  Statistics Australia 1990-1992 
Canada  Statistics Canada Life Tables, 1990-1992 
US  Social Security Administration, 1991 
Japan  Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Statistics Division, 1990 
Italy  National Institute of Statistics, 1991 
Source: Authors’ computations; see McCarthy and Mitchell (2002). 
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Figure 6: Distribution of US Male Population versus Annuitant Age at Death, Conditional 
on Survival to Age 65 (US Male) 
  
 
 
Source: Mitchell (2002) 
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
6
5
6
7
6
9
7
1
7
3
7
5
7
7
7
9
8
1
8
3
8
5
8
7
8
9
9
1
9
3
9
5
9
7
9
9
1
0
1
1
0
3
1
0
5
1
0
7
1
0
9
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
5
1
1
7
1
1
9
US M Ann
US M Pop  34
Figure 7:  Predicted Male Cohort A/E Values for Variety of Countries; Male Population 
Mortality and Annuitant Mortality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Figure derived from A/E values predicted using regression estimates in Table 4. 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
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Figure 8: Cross-national Predicted Values: Actual and Predicted Values of A/E Metrics   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A/E values for male and female annuitant mortality computed from RG48 tables for Italy 
(estimated from MacDonald, 1997), DAV1994R tables for Germany (MacDonald, 1997), EPF 
and TQPP mortality tables for Japan compulsory annuitants (data kindly provided by the 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare) and the Japan Institute of Actuaries for Japan annuitants.  
Figure shows actual A/E values and 95% confidence intervals for predicted A/E values from 
model described in Table 4. Circled values fall outside the 95% confidence intervals; see text. 
Source: Authors’ computations following methodology described in McCarthy and Mitchell 
(2002). 
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Figure 9:  Objective and Anticipated Survival Probabilities to Ages 75 and 85 
  
 
 
 
       
Note: Subjective probabilities of survival to age 75 and 85 reported by Wave 2 respondents in the 
Health and Retirement Study, born 1931-1941 and interviewed in 1994. Responses weighted by 
sample weights. 
Source: Hurd and McGarry (1997) 
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Figure 11: Old Age Replacement Rates for Selected OECD Countries 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure shows show disposable income for persons aged 65-74 as a percentage of those age 55-64.  
Source: Table 6 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Denmark
Norway
Australia
Finland
Mexico
Sweden
Italy
Greece
United States
Netherlands
Germany
Govt transfers Capital Inc. Earnings  38
Figure 12:  Term of Bond Required to Match Mean Duration of Life Annuity, As a 
Function of the Interest Rate   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Bonds assumed to trade at par with coupons paid continuously.  
Source:  Authors’ computations using US Male Voluntary Annuitant Cohort Mortality (see 
McCarthy and Mitchell, 2002). 
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Table 1:  Life Expectancy Remaining and Probabilities of Survival to Selected Ages: Men and 
Women at Age 65 (in 2000)   
 
 
 
  Men  Women 
Remaining Life   
Expectancy (years): 
 
16.4 
 
19.6 
Probability of Surviving to Age:     
70  88%  92% 
75  74  82 
80  56  69 
85  36  51 
90  18  31 
95  6  14 
100  1  4 
 
 
 
Source:  Brown (2000) 
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 Table 2:  Immediate Monthly Annuity Payouts Per $1000 Premium, By Age and Sex  
 
 
 
          Age 55     Age 65     Age 75 
All Companies, Average: 
Men          6.64        7.94       10.52 
Women        6.24      7.17        9.22 
Ten Highest Payouts, Average: 
Men          7.38      8.72       11.61 
Women        6.88      7.76        9.99 
Ten Lowest Payouts, Average: 
Men          5.98      7.25        9.45 
Women        5.59      6.56        8.63 
Twenty Highest Rated Firms, Average: 
Men          6.50      7.78       10.35 
Women        6.09      7.07        9.09 
Ten Largest Annuity Firms, Average: 
Men          6.72      7.98       10.43 
Women        6.31      7.21        9.14 
 
 
Note: Each entry indicates the monthly income payable as a life annuity, based on the purchase 
of a $100,000 single premium immediate policy at the ages specified.  The $100,000 purchase 
price is inclusive of policy fees but exclusive of annuity premium taxes. Data are for 1995. 
Source:  MPWB (1999). 
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Table 3: Comparative Data on Actual/Expected  (A/E) Mortality Measures for Purchasers 
of Voluntary and Compulsory Life Annuities versus Population:  Age 65 by Sex. 
 
 
         
   Voluntary  Compulsory  Population 
   Annuities  Annuities   
        
 Males       
 UK  67.5 82.6 100 
 US  65.3 84.0 100 
 Japan  81.8 na 100 
    
 Females   
 UK  73.5 84.9 100 
 US  73.6 90.8 100 
 Japan  100.7 na 100 
  
 
 
Notes: na means not available.  Base table (=100) is population table for each country and 
gender.       
Source: McCarthy and Mitchell (forthcoming).    42
Table 4: Regression of A/E Metrics on Type of Mortality Table, Country Effects, and 
Interactions  
 
 
 
  Coeff.  Std Err 
     
Female  -34.68**  2.79 
Comp Ann  -26.17**  3.47 
Vol Ann  -32.95**  3.01 
Cohort  -12.33**  2.85 
 
FxCompAnn 
 
6.88 
 
4.65 
FxVolAnn  11.48**  4.14 
FxCohort  3.33  3.79 
 
UK 
 
7.79** 
 
2.91 
Canada  -9.93**  3.35 
Chile  7.57*  4.31 
Australia  -8.95**  3.67 
Israel  11.68**  4.31 
Italy  6.14  5.66 
Austria  13.94**  4.17 
Germany  6.49  4.19 
Switzerland  -9.10**  3.72 
Japan  -13.91**  5.66 
 
Intercept 
 
106.97** 
 
2.94 
Adj R-square       98.8% 
N of Obs       64 
 
 
 
Notes:  * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%. 
Source: Authors’ computations following McCarthy and Mitchell (forthcoming).  
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Table 5:  Comparisons of Annuity Values: Money’s Worth and Annuity Equivalent Wealth  
 
A: Money’s Worth of Nominal Annuity Payouts: Single Premium Nominal Life Annuities 
Offered to 65-Year Olds Across Countries 
 
 
 
 
                                      
  UK  Australia  Canada  Switzerland  US  Italy 
   Pop  Ann  Pop  Ann  Pop  Ann  Pop  Ann  Pop  Ann  Pop  Ann 
Men  0.897  0.966  0.914  0.986  0.925 1.014  0.965  NA  0.814  0.927  NA  0.958 
Women  0.910  0.957  0.910  0.970  0.937 1.015  1.115  NA  0.852  0.927  NA  0.965 
                                      
 
 
  
Note: Computations use country Treasury yield curve. Pop refers to population mortality table 
while Ann refers to annuitant mortality table. 
Source:  James and Vittas (1999) for UK, Australia, Canada, and Switzerland; MPWB (1999) for 
US; Cardinale (2002) for Italy.  
 
 
B:  Annuity Equivalent Wealth Values:  US Male Age 65 
 
              (I)          (II)     
     Annuity Equivalent Wealth for Real and Nominal Annuities  
 
Consumer with No Pre-Existing 
Annuity Wealth 
Consumer With Half of Initial 
Wealth in Pre-Existing Real Annuity 
Coefficient of 
Relative Risk 
Aversion 
(CRRA) 
 
Real 
Annuity 
Nominal 
Annuity:  
i.i.d. 
inflation 
Nominal 
Annuity: 
Persistent 
Inflation 
 
Real 
Annuity 
Nominal 
Annuity:  
i.i.d. 
inflation 
Nominal 
Annuity: 
Persistent 
Inflation 
1  1.502  1.451  1.424  1.330  1.304  1.286 
2  1.650  1.553  1.501  1.441  1.403  1.366 
5  1.855  1.616  1.487  1.623  1.515  1.450 
10  2.004  1.592  1.346  1.815  1.577  1.451 
 
 
 
Note:  The annuity equivalent wealth calculation for the nominal annuity assumes inflation takes 
one of six possible values, roughly capturing the distribution of inflation outcomes over the 
1926-1997 period. Inflation shocks are assumed independent across periods in the i.i.d. case and 
follow a stylized AR(1) process in the persistent inflation case.   
Source: Mitchell (2002)   44
 
Table 6:  Old Age Replacement Rates for Selected OECD Countries   
 
 
 
 
Note: Table reports show total disposable income for persons aged 65-74 as a percentage of those age 55-
64.  
Source: OECD data from Feldstein and Seibert (2002). 
Country Govt Tsfr Capital/SEInc. Earnings Total
Denmark 37.6 22.3 9.6 69.4
Norway 36.1 24.5 11.7 72.3
Australia 39.5 24.7 10.9 75
Finland 17.1 54 4.4 75.5
Mexico 9.7 25.6 40.3 75.6
Sweden 64.6 6 5.5 76.1
Italy 56.2 7.2 15.3 78.7
Greece 48.3 21.6 10 79.9
United States 28 30.2 21.7 79.9
Netherlands 38.6 35 7.2 80.8
Germany 59.6 14.4 10.4 84.4
Average 39.57 24.14 13.36 77.05  45
 
Table 7: Implicit Tax Rates on Continued Work at Older Ages, due to Benefit Programs 
for the Elderly: OECD countries, 1995 
 
 
 
Old-age 
pensions 
Unemployment 
related benefits
 1
Disability 
benefits
 1
Special early-
retirement 
2
United States 12 .. .. ..
Japan 28 .. .. ..
Germany 14 37 46 ..
France 14 49 .. 57
Italy 79 ..
3 ..
3 ..
3
United Kingdom 5 15 .. ..
Canada 6 .. .. ..
Australia 0 20 21 ..
Austria 34 34 64 ..
Belgium 23 37 44 56
Denmark 0 51 37 22
Finland 22 42 71 ..
Ireland 14 32 32 ..
Luxembourg 29 65 63 51
Netherlands 8 57 41 ..
 4
New Zealand 9 27 .. ..
Norway 15 .. 65 17
Portugal 4 33 66 ..
Spain 18 33 53 ..
Sweden 18 .. 76 ..
Switzerland 0 .. .. ..
Notes:
1. ".." denotes that early retirement into non-employment benefit system is 
    not an option because of entitlement conditions.
2. ".." denotes no public schemes or such schemes are not much used.
3. Schemes not relevant for a worker with a long contribution history  
    as he can retire prior to standard retirement age with full old-age pension.
4. Special early retirement schemes in the Netherlands are not mandatory.
Source: Feldstein and Seibert (2002)
Old age pensions plus: